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Tom Slick Graduate Fellow at Texas A&M University
rajorshi@tamu.edu
ABSTRACT
Food and Beverage companies need to share their Intellectual Property (IP) 
when they outsource production and/or R&D to contract agents. IP sharing 
can facilitate misappropriation and the contractor may eventually start 
competing with the client. We design an incentive compatible contract that 
can protect company IP. A two-pronged strategy is proposed: Companies 
should share less know-how and give high incentive payments to deter IP 
misappropriation. Strategies like product differentiation may be highly 
useful to deter piracy. 
OVERVIEW
• Companies are asking themselves - do we need to make “our” products ourselves?
• There are compelling economic benefits from outsourcing production and/or R&D
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t = 0
P offers R&D contract, 
A accepts or rejects   
t =1
P decides how much 
IP to share with A  
A decides whether to misappropriate IP 
and set up a competing firm, 
Or
continue with 
Contractual relationship with the P
t = 2
A exerts effort to produce R&D
t = 3
Contractual terms realized :
payments made according to quality 
of R&D produced
Or
Duopoly competition with Pirate firm
• Expected profits depend on IP shared (k) by the Principal 
• Agent’s outside option Ψ(k) is endogenous
• Maximize [2] subject to [1]
First Best Solution: Effort is observable 
Important Observations
Legal protections may not be enough to protect IP. Hence companies that are willing to outsource 
operations to contract agents must take appropriate measures to protect their IP.
 What can companies do in order to mitigate risks of IP loss while outsourcing?
• Share only adequate level of proprietary knowledge with vendors. 
• Companies may invest in product-differentiation and brand loyalty
Strategies to protect Intellectual Property 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. In spite of the efficiencies, outsourcing is not favored by all companies. 
What explains this aversion to outsource among FB companies ? 
2. If a company wishes to outsource production and /or R&D, 
then how   
should it design an efficient contract that would reduce cost
and
protect its IP ?
Concerns with Production outsourcing
Outsourcing brings a loss of product control, dilutes/eliminates brand 
integrity, and opens the door to product recalls
Concerns with R&D outsourcing 
Firms that outsource R&D indicate that their most significant 
problem is loss of intellectual property. Brand identity is also 
difficult to maintain when there is IP loss.
FB companies outsource different tasks/operations:
-Production (reasons: lack of manufacturing capacity, lower costs)
Example: Whole Bakers developed a healthy Gluten free cookie recipe but 
the bakery lacked large scale production capacity. Whole Bakers 
contracted production to Pac-Moore, a contract mixing, blending and 
packaging specialist.
-R&D (reasons: gain “access to technology/equipment”, lower costs)
-Information Technology
“The outsourcing of our IT infrastructure and outsourcing management has 
allowed us to concentrate on our core competencies. And in a heated-up 
marketplace where every advantage counts, the ability to focus on what’s 
key makes all the difference.”—Domino Foods Inc. CIO Don Whittington
Examples of successful outsourcing by FB companies
Domino Foods outsource IT to Capgemini
Kraft outsources certain IT operations to Capgemini 
Dean Foods outsource to Telerx 
Companies work with Nerac to develop innovative R&D
R&D result is uncertain                           Cost =
Model Development: 
Outsourcing
•A company (Principal) can either do the production / R&D tasks in-house , 
or may outsource the tasks to an Agent through contracts.
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Strategies to protect Intellectual Property 
KEY IDEA: How to reduce the attractiveness of the outside option of the Agent ?
 
0   


L H C C
k







Tasks should be outsourced to regions where legal protection is strong
First Best Solution: Effort is observable 
Participation Constraint of Agent
) , (
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First Best Solution: Effort is observable 
Second Best Solution: Effort is unobservable 
• Maximize [2] subject to [1] and 
































When effort is unobservable, the optimal contract payment should be contingent upon R&D result
Second Best Solution: Effort is unobservable 
  H H
house in





In-House Approach  Model Development: 
Outsourcing
Model Development: Outsourcing
Loss from piracy would be large if     θ is high












P C C E Loss from piracy =
• If tasks are done in-house then the Principal would have higher control over 
production/ R&D.
• Higher control entails higher cost compared to outsourcing.
For Food and Beverage products, the degree of substitutability can be very high.




Strategies to protect Intellectual Property 
In order to reduce the loss from piracy, companies ought to invest in assets that would reduce θ. 
Product differentiation is one such effective strategy.
Produce differentiated product , charge a premium price and sustain an IP theft problem 
Companies that outsource and yet protect their brands successfully can do so because 
of proper management of their contract manufacturers. 
Our model suggests that contract Agent must be paid incentive payments so that IP 
theft can be avoided. 
While this is the first line of defense, we argue that the Principal must also invest in 
product differentiation and customer loyalty. 
This answers our Research Question 2.
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